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In this review, the issues of radiation and nucleus safety at dealing with nuclear waste (RW) are considered. The 
examples of already worked out technologies on definition of the isotopes contents of uranium and plutonium in 
radioactive waste are adduced; the possibilities of implementation of techniques with application of electron linac 
are shown.
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1. SOME ASPECTS ON THE HANDLING OF 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE
First  of  all,  it  is  about  safeguarding  a  radiation 
security.  According to the Radiation Safety Standards 
and  main  sanitary  regulations,  the  firm  radioactive 
waste (RW) is considered to be radioactive in case its 
activity makes more than 10−8 Ci/kg [1]. With provision 
of specific activities for  238U and 235U it corresponds to 
concentrations  of  3·10−5 g/g  and  4.7·10−6 g/g.  The 
liquid  RW  are  considered  to  be  radioactive,  if  the 
contents  of  some  radionuclide  or  mixture  of  several 
radionuclides  exceeds  acceptable  concentration  levels 
established for water. So the liquid RW on value of a 
specific activity is subdivided into following categories:
– radioactive waste with low activity-is lower than 
10−5 Ci/l;
– radioactive waste with mean activity-from 10−5 up 
to 1 Ci/l;
Secondly, the safeguarding of nuclear safety is the 
main  issue  in  nuclear  power  engineering.  In  this 
direction the researches are conducted and the different 
aspects  of  radioactive  waste  handling  and  its 
environmental impact are discussed. 
So, in article [2], the conditions, which may cause a 
self-sustaining chain reaction in a process of handling of 
the RW possessing small quantities of fission stuffs, are 
considered.  The  typical  waste  from  plants  producing 
HGA is analyzed as well as firms of a fuel cycle such as 
NPO "Radon", where the waste possessing fissile stuff 
is stored for long term and prepared for storage.  Liquid 
waste  with  concentration  of  uranium of  1-5 Ci/l  also 
refers  to them. The similar situation can arise also at 
other plants of a fuel cycle. Even within low specific 
contents  of  fission  stuffs  in  huge  volumes,  forming 
thousand cubic meters, the probability of originating of 
self-sustaining chain reaction of fission is not expelled. 
The self-sustaining nuclear reaction became possible at 
the contents~3 g of 235U on 1 kg. 
As  at  process  and  storage  the  contents  of  fissile 
stuffs in waste can change (increase), the originating a 
self-sustaining  nuclear  fission  reaction  is  possible  in 
certain conditions. That is why a systematic analysis of 
nuclear  safety  of  all  RW  handling  system  is 
indispensable, which is split into three phases:
− the analysis of a radioactive waste from the point 
of view of danger of originating of self-sustaining chain 
reaction of fission;
− the analysis of technological processes of conversion;
− the analysis of nuclear safety at long-time storage 
of processed waste;
All kinds of waste are divided into two groups by 
characteristic of material in order to define criterion of 
nuclear  safety.  The waste,  containing mainly graphite 
belongs to the first group, the waste of the second one 
mainly contains hydrogenous moderators. In work [3] it 
is  proposed to use surface density of  fission stuffs as 
criterion of  nuclear  safety for  storehouses.  In  Table 1 
the surface density for different compounds of uranium 
and plutonium is adduced.
The  analysis  of  nuclear  safety  of  storehouses,  in 
which  barrels  with  a  volume  of  200 l,  diameter  of 
560 mm and thickness  of  a  steel  wall  of  1,5 mm are 
arranged closely in four circles by height, shows that in 
order  to  avoid  the  self-sustaining  chain  reaction  of 
fission, each barrel should contain not more than 50 g of 
plutonium and up to 80 g 235U.
These conditions are provided for firm waste with 
low  activity  NPO  "Radon".  However,  the  volume  of 
waste decreases  in  70…100 times during incineration 
and it can move over to category of the waste with mean 
activity.
Therefore, it is necessary to carry out analysis on the 
contents  of  fission stuffs  before incineration of  waste 
with low activity.
In  case  of  liquid  waste  the  safe  concentration  of 
aqueous solutions of uranium and plutonium makes 9 
and 7 g/1 accordingly. However, there is a probability 
of  fission  stuffs  sedimentation  and  obtaining  of  large 
concentration  that  also  demands  the  analysis  of  their 
contents.
In  work  the  typical  waste  is  reviewed,  which  is 
supposed to  be stored or  to  be sent  for  processing in 
NPO "Radon" and the calculations for definition of the 
secure specific contents  235U with regard for content of 
water (Table 2) are adduced.
Besides  the  rate  of  fission stuff  concentration,  the 
chemical,  mechanical  and  physical  processes  within 
which  the  fission  stuffs  are  separated  from  nuclides 
absorbing neutrons are important in order to determine a 
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probability fro originating of self-sustained fission chain 
reaction. 
Table 1. Secure and critical surface density of  
fission stuffs (g/см2 235U or 239Pu)
Connection Critical Secure
239Pu + H2О 0,2 0,14
U∗+ H2О 0,37 0,26
U∗∗+ H2О 0,5 0,35
239Pu + C 0,036 0,025
U∗+ C 0,052 0,036
U∗∗+ C 0,06 0,042
Note:  uranium  is  enriched  90  and  5%  on  235U 
accordingly
Table 2. The secure specific contents of fission stuffs  
for firm waste
Waste
Elemental 
composition, 
mass lobe of 
components, 
%
Enrich-
ment of 
uranium, 
%
Secure 
specific 
contents 
of waste, 
235Ug/кg
Gum
С 70-90
Н 3-10
О 1-10
S 3-10
4,4
90
0,78
0,48
Graphite С~100 4,490
0,09
0,08
Ceramic of 
boards
О 50-70
Si 20-30
Al 10-20
Fe 1-2
4,4
90
3,6
2,1
Polyethylene 
items
С 86
Н 14 4,4 12
Fluoroplastic
F 41-76
C 21-24
H 0-7
Cl 0-30
90
4,4
13,5
7
Organic 
glass
С 60-80
Н4
О 10-30
90
4,4
90
6,9
4,3
3,9
Zirconium 
waste
N 3
Zr 100
4,4
90
1,6
0,9
Plastic, 
tissue of 
PHV
С 38
Н 5
Cl 57
4,4
90
38
8,1
In  October  1999  the  International  conference 
TOPSEAL- 99,  which was organized by Belgian and 
European nuclear companies at support of the American 
nuclear  company,  IAEA  and  Agencies  on  atomic 
engineering  of  countries  OECD  (NEA)  was  held  in 
Antwerp  (Belgium)  [4].  The  representatives  from  22 
European  countries  and  also  from Egypt,  Russia,  the 
USA,  Taiwan,  Southern  Korea  participated in  it.  The 
main  subject  of  the  conference  was  creation  of 
international  storehouse  for  the  spent  fissile  material. 
Records of the conference contain short information on 
status of RW dumping for the last 10 years as well as 
the prospects of a research direction by treatment of the 
RW. The following activities are planned:
– formation of general approaches for treatment of 
the RW;
– working  out  of  technical  measures  on 
environmental protection, safety and stable exploitation;
– working out of  the project  of  storehouse for  the 
long-lived RW, in particular, prolongation of activities 
aimed  to  solve  existing  technical  problems  and  to 
coordinate  technical  and  legal  issues  between  the 
organizations - participants.
More  than  50  projects  on  the  RW  treatment 
problems for  the total  amount  of  around €37 millions 
were completed in the period 1994-1998. These projects 
concerned mainly the following subjects:
– aspects of safety at RW dumping;
– field experiments on the underground exploratory 
installations;
– research  of  features  of  the  main  technological 
processes of RW treatment and other.
The  field  experiments  were conducted in  Belgium 
on  three  underground  trial  installations  in  different 
geological conditions and with the purpose of:
– check  and  demonstrating  of  the  concepts  of 
dumping;
– filling and seal of storehouse;
– monitoring for  long-term condition a  component 
of storehouse.
2. SITUATION IN UKRAINE
In Ukraine the problem of the spent fissile material 
treatment  appeared  in  1997,  when  the  exportation  of 
spent fissile to Russia for processing and dumping was 
stopped  [5]  (in  1997,  only  4,6%  from  the  existing 
amount  of  spent  HGA accumulated  on  atomic  power 
stations  (APS)  and  research  reactors  was  sent  to 
Russia).
At  Zaporozhye  APS  it  is  planned  to  create  a 
storehouse of a  dry type in connection with a critical 
situation  on  conventional  storage  of  exhaust  fissile 
material in basins of exposure.
The  main  producers  of  a  radioactive  waste  in 
Ukraine and places of its concentration for today are:
− APS (spent fissile material);
− industry  on  a  mining  of  uranium  and  process 
industry  (65,5 mill. t  of  radioactive  waste  is 
accumulated);
− medical, scientific, industrial and other firms;
− the Ukrainian state association "Radon" (more than 
5000 m3 of radioactive waste is accumulated);
− the zone of  disposal  Chernobyl’  APS (more than 
1,1 bill. m3 of a radioactive waste).
The  main  objects  of  accumulation  of  the  greatest 
amount of the RW with high activity in Ukraine are the 
nuclear stations, on which its partial primary processing 
and temporary storage take place.
The radioactive waste at APS consists of liquid and 
firm waste. The  liquid waste are formed as a result of 
disturbance of hermetic sealing of a primary loop, sinks 
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per  head,  labs,  regeneration  waters  of  special  water 
purifying,  and  at  realization  of  decontamination 
activities.  The  product  of  processing  of  a  liquid 
radioactive waste-“the bottom remainder» is stored as it 
is  or  it  is  dabbed  in  order  to  decrease  volume  by  a 
method of evaporation. At all APS there is no full work 
cycle of primary processing of liquid radioactive waste. 
Only  at  Zaporozhye  and  Khmel’nitskiy  APS  the 
evaporation  up  to  salt  content  of  1500…1600 g/l  is 
carried out. At the rest of APS, liquid radioactive waste 
is stored as “distillation residue", which does not meet 
the requirements  stipulated in  the norms and rules  of 
treatment of liquid radioactive waste.
The firm radioactive waste is formed as a result of 
maintenance and repair of generating sets. On January 
1, 1998 in storehouses of APS in Ukraine, there were 
261126 m3 of a firm radioactive waste and 25216 m3 of 
“distillation residues". 
3. OBJECT “SHELTER”
Now fissile material is in object "Shelter" arranged 
in five modifications:
– pieces of an active zone;
– fuel  as  dust  with  the  comparative  sizes  of 
fragments from 1 micron up to hundreds of microns;
– stuffs  keeping fuel,  which represent  glassy mass 
formation in consequence of interaction of molten fuel 
with structural materials;
– solvable  salts  of  uranium  and  plutonium,  the 
concentration of uranium in which is 0,3 g/l;
– solvable  compounds  of  uranium  and  plutonium, 
which has sedimented.
Isotopes of  cesium, strontium, plutonium, uranium 
and americium represent the main radionuclides.
On  weight  the  stuffs  keeping  fuel,  in  percentage 
terms make: uranium oxides up to 1…8%, potassium –
1-2%,  calcium – 4…10%,  magnesium − 3…7%, 
aluminum  – 2…12%,  ferry  lactase − 3…10%, 
zirconium  − 2…4%, silicon-up to 60% and more. The 
congestions of masses containing fuel in the "Shelter" 
present nuclear danger conditioned by a probability of 
origination  of  self-sustaining  chain  reaction.  Under 
influencing  of  different  causes  and  due  to  physical-
chemical processes, the state and the properties of the 
masses  containing  fuel  is  changing  which  makes 
radiation safety situation at  the "Shelter" worse.  With 
the passage of time one may observe modification of the 
structure and properties of the masses containing fuel, 
which is conditioned:
– by appearance of cracks and decay of lava on large 
enough chunks;
– by  destruction  of  lava  with  formation  of 
radioactive dust;
– by  interaction  of  alkali  contained  in  water,  with 
radionuclides  and  by  formation  of  new  solvable 
compounds.
4. METHOD FOR DETECTION OF THE 
CONTENTS OF TRANSURANICS IN 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE
In  France  in  CEA-DRN-DER-  SSAE  and  DGA-
DRET-ETCA-DPN the  technique  for  detection  of  the 
contents  of  transuranics  with  the  help  of  a  electrons 
linac  is  being  worked  out.  The  method  founded  on 
results  from  counting  photofission-induced  delayed 
neutrons from transuranics [6]. In activity, the linac of 
electrons with energy up to 30 MeV, mean current of 
the  beam  140 μA,  repetition  frequency  ranging  from 
6,25 up to 400 Hz and pulse width 2,5 μs was used. The 
main  problem at  debugging  of  the  techniques  was  a 
neutron background, the life-time of which was about 
20 ms.  In  this  connection,  the  test-pieces  of  the  RW 
were  placed  in  protection  from  polyethylene  and 
cadmium.  Neutron  detectors  for  a  monitoring  of 
photoneutrons and neutrons of fission were also placed 
here. In activity, there were 5 samples used: U-Pu with 
the  contents  of  uranium  of  3,83 g  and  plutonium  of 
1,9 g  accordingly;  samples  of  238U  (weight  100,  194, 
292 g;)  sample  of  235U  (weight  1,9 g).  Samples  were 
placed  in  cylindrical  units  from  polyethylene  with 
diameter of 10 cm and length of 20 cm and from glass 
with  diameter  of  10 cm  both  height  of  9 cm  and 
concrete with diameter of 56 cm and height of 110 cm 
with  density  0.95,  1.70,  2.35 g/cm3 accordingly.  In 
Table 3  the  minimum  weights  in  grams  are  shown, 
which were registered in the given experiment. 
Table 3
Element Matrix(СН2)n SiO2 Concrete
UPu 0,024 0,003 0,029
235U 0,016 0,027 0,058
238U 0,052 0,052 -
The  obtained  values  of  minimum  weights  for 
matrixes  U-Pu  and  235U,  determining  sensitivity  of 
technique, correspond to concentrations 8,94·10−7  and 
1,77·10−6 g/g. 
5. TECHNOLOGIES
The  company  SGN  and  department  of  physical 
researches  (DRP)  of  the  French  commission  on  an 
atomic energy (CEA) conduct intensive developments 
on  creation  of  engineering  of  the  active  and  passive 
analysis on definition of the contents of fissile stuffs in 
firm  and  fluid  radioactive  waste.  The  necessity  of 
development  of  methods  of  the  fissile  analysis  is 
conditioned by the following facts:
– low level of surface contamination in storehouses 
(some milligrams PuO2);
– greater amount of containers, contents of which is 
necessary to analyze in short time;
– the  development  of  technologies  of  a 
nondestructive examination is based on implementation 
of neutron-source 252Cf and neutron generators [7].
"COSAC" SYSTEM FOR 20-LITER BAGS
This system is designed for measurement of waste 
with very low activity located in 20 l  volumes with a 
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mild matrix. The main principle of the given system is 
the activation by neutrons from  252Cf of a source with 
the  subsequent  registration  a  gamma-quanta  and 
neutrons  of  fission.  The  system  "Cosac"  includes  a 
source and detectors, and also movable protection for a 
source  (Fig. 1).  Usage  of  gamma  -  detectors  allows 
logging 1 mg of plutonium PWR during 600 s. Owing 
to  the  neutrons  of  fission  the  low  limit  of  detecting 
makes 13 mg of plutonium PWR. 
Fig. 1. Cosac system at CEN/Cadarache
THE BANCO SYSTEM FOR 220-LITER DRUMS
The system is shown in a Fig. 2, which works in a 
mode of the passive analysis. The neutron counters and 
gamma-spectrometer  simultaneously  scan  along  a 
vertical axis of a rotated barrel. For mild matrixes with 
density  0,2  limits  of  detecting  make  about  10 mg  of 
plutonium for fuel PWR and about 40 mg in a mode of 
coincidence. In active version the neutron-source from 
252Cf with intensity 106 n/s will be used. The neutrons of 
fission are detected 3He-detectors. In this case limits of 
detecting make 30mg 235U and 200 mg of plutonium for 
fuel PWR. A time of an exposition 1000 s make.
Fig. 2. Banco system at CEN/Cadarache
5. NSC “KIPT”
In  NSC KIPT on the  basis  of  a  linac  complex of 
electrons LYE-300 for problem solving on detection of 
the contents of uranium isotopes and other fission stuffs 
in  the  RW  the  pulse  neutron-source  with  intensity 
1012 n/s  was  constructed.  The  trial  experiments  were 
conducted  on  the  electron  beam  with  energy 
Ee=20 MeV, mean current Ie = 2 µA and at frequency of 
50 Hz. After a rejecting magnet the beam was routed on 
the leaden converter by thickness 4 cm, which served 
the  neutron-making  target  [8].  After  the  target  the 
moderator from polyethylene with the thickness of 8 cm 
was established. All-band detector Mc-Kibben was used 
for registration of neutrons of fission. Delaying neutrons 
of fission between impulses of the accelerator with time 
interval  of  4  ms  after  a  synchro-pulse  were  basically 
registered during this trial. As the RW was used 10 kg 
of  sand  with  samples  of  uranium of  different  weight 
with 2% by enrichment. At an exposure time equal to 
600 s the minimum contents equal to 0.012 g  235U was 
registered  which  corresponds  to  concentration  1.2·10−
6 g/g.
The purpose of the following work was carrying out 
of  experiments  and  development  of  techniques  to 
analyze  concrete  samples  on  the  contents  of  238U  in 
them, which is necessary to solve problems linked with 
liquidation  of  Chernobyl  catastrophe  consequences 
[9,10]. The experiment was conducted under the same 
conditions,  as the previous one. Concrete  blocks with 
the  weight  of  0.5 kg  with  2%  enriched  uranium 
introduced in them were used as samples. Samples from 
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metal  uranium  2%  enriched  were  also  used  in  the 
experiment  as  calibrating  samples.  From  results  of 
comparison of yields of the neutrons from concrete and 
calibration  samples  it  was  shown  that  under  given 
conditions  of  the  experiment  it  is  possible  to  safely 
identify up to 10 g of  238U in concrete.  Now with the 
purpose of decreasing background the special stand on 
direct  output  linac  (Fig. 3)  is  built.  The  experiments 
conducted on a hem with the same concrete  samples, 
have allowed reducing detection limit 238U up to 300 mg 
and on 235U up to 1 mg which forms accordingly 6·10−4  
and 2·10−6 g/g.
Fig. 3.The scheme of the accelerator equipment
1. Section of a linac.
2. Rejecting magnet (35°, removed).
3. Doublet of quadruple lenses.
4. Collimator - monochromator of a beam.
5,9. Inductive transient-time sensors of a current.
6,11. Faraday cups with removed absorbers.
7,12. Screens with fluorescing cover. 
8. The trolley conveyor for moving of samples.
10. Doublet of short-focus quadruple lenses.
13. Ionization transient-time sensor of a current and 
position of a beam.
14.  The removed neutron-making target  air-cooled 
(target is established on mobile desktop).
15. Tested the sample of radioactive wastes.
16. Mc-Kibben detector.
17.  Combined  protection  of  the  counter  (paraffin, 
cadmium).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Now  on  the  treatment  to  the  RW  the  large 
development  was  received  by  industrial  technologies, 
founded on application of neutron-sources on the basis 
252Cf and neutron generators. The electrons linacs will 
be used for the present only for debugging techniques 
on  detection  of  small  quantities  235U  and  239Pu  in 
different matrixes. Nevertheless, problem on definition 
of  concentration  is  transuranic  are  rather  varied  both 
from the point of view of a radiation safety, and from 
the point of view of nuclear safety. The special value 
these problems have for Ukraine, as huge quantity of a 
firm and fluid radioactive waste of a nuclear industry 
and  Chernobuly  APS  is  accumulated,  which  require 
inventory.  The  pulse  neutron-source  with  powerful 
neutron flux is indispensable for this purpose, which can 
be received on the electron linac. The experiments with 
large volumes of a radioactive waste (200 l) on beams 
of neutrons and gamma-quanta are now planned [11].
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